Cartel & Bid-Rigging Surcharge and Damages

Cartel & Bid-Rigging Surcharge and Damages helps estimate Korea-related administrative, court, appeal, deposit, lawyer fee, registration, and enforcement cost assumptions in English.

Legal scenario inputs

Enter Korea-related court, traffic, debt, family, civil, medical-dispute, criminal, or real-estate dispute assumptions. Results are simplified planning estimates.

Variable case-cost reserve

₩500,000,000

Fixed court or service cost

₩500,000

Total case reserve

₩500,500,000

Monthly reserve target

₩250,250,000

₩5,500,500,000 all-in exposure

Cartel sanctions follow the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) Arts. 40, 43, 109, and 124, Enforcement Decree Art. 84 and Annex 6, and the KFTC Surcharge Notification (Notice 2026-3). The surcharge is capped at 20% of related sales (or a fixed KRW 4B when there are no sales); the base rate rises with severity (less serious / serious / very serious), and the period and repeat-violation history aggravate it. First-rank self-reporting (leniency) exempts 100% of the surcharge and second-rank cooperation cuts 50%. Cartel damages reach up to 3x the actual loss (Art. 109), except leniency applicants are capped at actual loss. Criminal exposure is up to 3 years or a KRW 200M fine (Art. 124). Korea-based 2026 estimate, not legal advice.

Related calculators

What is the cartel surcharge and damages calculator?

A cartel (unfair concerted practice) is an agreement among two or more firms to fix prices, output, bids, or territories and thereby restrict competition. When it is caught, the firm faces two separate money burdens in Korea: an administrative surcharge imposed by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), and civil damages claimed by the victims.

This calculator estimates the surcharge step by step from the related sales, the severity of the violation, the violation period, and the leniency status, and it also computes the civil damages (up to three times the actual loss) from the loss amount and the multiplier. It helps you understand Korea’s complex surcharge structure and see how self-reporting (leniency) affects both the surcharge and the damages.

Korea-based calculator

This tool is based on Korean rules (2026 basis): the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) Arts. 40, 43, 109, and 124, its Enforcement Decree Art. 84 and Annex 6, and the KFTC Surcharge Notification (Notice 2026-3). The surcharge cap is 20% of related sales (a fixed KRW 4 billion cap when there are no sales), and cartel damages can reach three times the actual loss. It is a simplified estimate, not legal advice, and does not replace review by a Korean competition lawyer.

Who this is useful for

  • Firms under KFTC investigation who want a rough sense of the surcharge scale
  • Compliance staff weighing whether to self-report a price-fixing or bid-rigging cartel
  • Injured companies considering a treble-damages claim for cartel harm
  • Students and practitioners learning how related sales and severity change the surcharge
  • Legal and compliance teams checking the numeric effect of leniency

How is the surcharge calculated? (five stages)

A cartel surcharge is not set in one shot; it passes through several rounds of adjustment defined by the KFTC Surcharge Notification. Understanding the order explains why the same sales can produce very different surcharges.

Stage 1. Base standard

The base standard equals the related sales during the violation period multiplied by the base rate. The base rate depends on whether the violation is a “less serious”, “serious”, or “very serious” violation, and it cannot exceed 20% of related sales. When related sales cannot be measured, a fixed surcharge of up to KRW 4 billion applies instead.

Stage 2. First adjustment (conduct factors)

A longer violation period aggravates the base standard. Over one year adds at least 10%, over two years at least 20%, and over three years between 50% and 80%. This is why long-running cartels draw much larger surcharges.

Stage 3. Second adjustment (offender factors)

A firm that repeated the same violation over the past ten years can be aggravated by up to 100% based on a cumulative-point score. Conversely, a firm that cooperated with the investigation or corrected the violation receives a reduction. The firm’s history and attitude enter here.

Stage 4. Leniency reduction

The first firm to self-report the cartel is exempted from 100% of the surcharge, and the second cooperating firm receives a 50% reduction. Leniency applicants may also gain relief from corrective orders and immunity from criminal referral, which is why cartel members race to report first.

Stage 5. Final surcharge determination

Finally, the KFTC may reduce the amount considering the firm’s realistic ability to pay, market or economic conditions, and the effect of the violation on the market. The amount confirmed here is the surcharge actually imposed.

Legal basis — the Fair Trade Act

  • Article 40 (prohibition of unfair concerted practices): bans nine types of collusion — price fixing, trading terms, output restriction, territory or customer allocation, bid rigging, and more.
    If two or more firms act in parallel and exchange information, an agreement is presumed.
  • Article 43 (surcharge): a cartel surcharge may be imposed up to 20% of related sales; where there are no sales, up to KRW 4 billion.
  • Article 109 (liability for damages): a firm that violates Article 40 is liable for up to three times the loss.
    However, leniency applicants and cooperators (Article 44) are not liable beyond the actual loss.
  • Article 124 (penalties): a cartel participant faces up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to KRW 200 million, and both may be imposed together.

The 2020 full amendment (in force 2021) doubled the cartel surcharge cap from 10% to 20% of related sales and the fixed cap from KRW 2 billion to KRW 4 billion.
Damages were also strengthened from actual-loss compensation to treble punitive damages, making cartel sanctions substantially heavier overall.

Base rate and severity

For the same related sales, the base rate changes with how serious the violation is. The KFTC scores severity using the detailed evaluation table in Annex, and this calculator offers representative values for each band that you can adjust yourself.

  • • Less serious violation: roughly 0.5%–5.0% of related sales
  • • Serious violation: roughly 5.0%–10.0%
  • • Very serious violation: roughly 10.0%–20.0% (statutory cap 20%)

Severity reflects the effect on market competition, the size of the illegal gain, and the scope of the affected region and consumers.
A nationwide price-fixing cartel or a large public bid-rigging case is likely classified as very serious and draws a base rate close to the cap.

How to use

Step 1: Enter related sales and violation type

Enter the related sales during the violation period and choose the type (price fixing, bid rigging, and so on). If sales cannot be measured, switch to fixed-surcharge mode and enter a base amount up to KRW 4 billion.

Step 2: Set severity and base rate

Choosing one of the three severity levels applies a representative base rate automatically. You can also adjust it from 0% to 20% with the slider.

Step 3: Enter the period and adjustment factors

Entering the violation period suggests a first-stage aggravation rate. Adjust the repeat-violation aggravation, cooperation reduction, and ability-to-pay reduction as needed.

Step 4: Check leniency and damages

Choosing a leniency status applies both the surcharge reduction and the damages-multiplier limit. Enter the actual loss and the multiplier to see the treble-damages estimate.

Scenarios

Scenario 1. Large price-fixing cartel

Suppose related sales of KRW 10 billion, a very serious violation (base rate 15%), and a four-year period (period aggravation 50%). The base standard is KRW 1.5 billion and the first-adjusted amount KRW 2.25 billion, but the statutory cap of 20% of related sales — KRW 2 billion — applies. Without leniency, the surcharge lands around KRW 2 billion.

Scenario 2. Bid rigging with second-rank leniency

Suppose related sales of KRW 5 billion, a serious violation (base rate 7.5%), and a two-year bid-rigging case where the firm cooperated as the second reporter. After a period aggravation on the KRW 375 million base standard, a 50% leniency reduction halves the surcharge. Because the firm is a leniency applicant, the damages multiplier is also limited to one.

Scenario 3. First-rank leniency exemption

The first firm to report the cartel is exempted from 100% of the surcharge. No matter how large the base standard, the final surcharge becomes zero and criminal referral may be waived. Still, the actual-loss liability toward victims remains, so damages do not disappear entirely.

Frequently asked questions (FAQ)

Q. What are related sales based on?

A. Related sales are the revenue from the goods or services subject to the cartel during the violation period.
They cover only the affected market, not total revenue, and the exact figure is fixed during the KFTC review.

Q. When does the 20% cap apply?

A. If the amount after the first and second adjustments exceeds 20% of related sales, it is cut to 20%.
This cap is often reached in long-running or repeated cartels with many aggravating factors.

Q. Does leniency also cancel damages?

A. No.
A leniency applicant is relieved of surcharge and criminal exposure, but liability for the victims’ actual loss remains.
Only the treble punitive multiplier is removed, limiting liability to the actual loss.

Q. Are treble damages always granted?

A. Three times is only a ceiling, not an automatic figure.
The court sets the multiplier considering intent, the scale of harm, the gain to the firm, any fine or surcharge already imposed, and remedial efforts.

Q. Does this match the actual imposed amount?

A. The real base rate is set by the KFTC’s detailed score and many adjustments apply, so the actual amount can differ.
This calculator is a reference tool for understanding the structure and estimating a rough scale.

Cautions and tips

  • Leniency rank is decisive: the race for leniency is fierce, so prompt action once a cartel is recognized drives the size of the reduction.
  • Confirm the related-sales scope: how the affected market and period are defined swings the surcharge, so organize the records carefully.
  • Surcharge and damages are separate: paying the surcharge does not stop victims’ civil claims, so manage both risks together.
  • Build compliance: a fair-trade compliance program (CP) that blocks employee cartel risk helps with investigation response and reduction.
  • Consult a specialist: real surcharge and damages vary widely by case, so review by a Korean competition lawyer is safest.

Check the scale of cartel surcharge and damages

Enter related sales, severity, and leniency status to instantly compute the surcharge and the damages.

Review the leniency effect, the 20% statutory cap, and treble damages on a 2026 basis.